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"THE LION OF THE DAY":
DIPLOMACY, STATES' RIGHTS,
AND PARTY POLITICS IN THE
AROOSTOOK WAR
BY JOHN A. SOARES, JR.

Historians typically dismiss the so-called Aroostook War as an insignificant event that unfolded in the uncivilized northeast frontier. Yet this
seemingly minor conflict allows us to examine how both partisan politics
and the growing debate over national and state authority dominated political and diplomatic affairs in the antebellum period. This political
contest highlights the roles played by Winfield Scott, a Whig, and John
Fairfield, a Democrat, in achieving an acceptable compromise between
Maine and New Brunswick. Like many regional affairs of this time, the
Aroostook War can only be fully understood within this national context.
John A. Soares, Jr. is a visiting assistant professor of History at the University of Notre Dame from 2005-07. He previously taught U.S. foreign
policy at the University of Cincinnati and George Washington University. His recent publications include "Sagacious Beyond Praise: Winfield
Scott and Anglo-American-Canadian Boarder Diplomacy,'' with Scott
Kaufman in Diplomatic History.

T

HE AROOSTOOK WAR, a border dispute between Maine and New
Brunswick, came to a head in February 1839 as local authorities
in Maine and New Brunswick moved toward a showdown that
neither London nor Washington desired. Before war could break out,
however, President Martin Van Buren sent General Winfield Scott to
Maine. A hero of the War of 1812 with a proven record of military success against the British, Scott reassured residents of Maine that any
British attack would be resisted. As a Whig representing a Democratic
administration, he could promote bipartisan cooperation among
Maine's politicians. This prevented either party from using bellicose
rhetoric as a political ploy in the highly competitive state political arena.
Scott also had the confidence of Sir John Harvey, his one-time military
antagonist then serving as Lieutenant-Governor of New Brunswick.
Scott's strength in combining diplomacy with the prospect of military
force facilitated a truce by mid-March. One biographer wrote that
Maine History 42:4 July 2006
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Winfield Scott was a Virginian whose father served in the American Revolution.
During the War of 1812, the young lieutenant-colonel commanded troops along
the Ca nadian border, and when he was ordered to mediate the border dispute
kn own as the Aroostook War, he was already on his way to becom ing America's
most prominent military figure. Edward D. Mansfield, Tire Life of Gc11ernl Wi11jicld Scott ( 1846).
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"Scott's conduct in this tangle of motives and political cross-currents
was sagacious beyond praise." More restrained, Maine's Governor John
Fairfield wrote after the president's emissary arrived, "General Scott is
here and is now the lion of the day." 1
While Scott's background was largely military, this lion played a crucial role in preventing armed conflict in the Aroostook War. There were
only two reported fatalities in Maine during the war: a soldier who died
of measles, and a Maine farmer killed by a ricocheting bullet at a peace
celebration after the danger of war had passed. Because the dispute
ended without open warfare, it possesses certain comic qualities; historians deride it as an "absurd bicker" and label it the "Pork and Beans War,"
a reference to the inordinate amount of money spent on provisioning
the militia, relative to the little action they saw. "The episode," as one
scholar noted, "has been viewed by historians with a good deal of merriment."2 That the Aroostook War became a source of amusement rather
than an armed conflict was due in good part to Scott's diplomatic success in negotiating the problems posed by states' rights and party politics
in Maine.
Tensions Mount
The troubles that culminated in the Aroostook War originated with
the 1783 Treaty of Paris, which ended the American Revolutionary War.
Relying on inaccurate maps and surveys, the treaty delineated a boundary without correct landmarks, which led to disputes over which topographical features corresponded to those in the treaty. The boundary
was not one of the major issues leading to the War of 1812, and thus it
was not clarified by the Treaty of Ghent, which ended that conflict. In
1827 the Americans and British approved a convention specifying rules
for mediation of the dispute, appointing King William I of the Netherlands as arbitrator. Maine Governor Enoch Lincoln protested this appointment, stating to Secretary of State Henry Clay that the king "rarely
decides upon strict principles of law" but was rather inclined "to try, if
possible, to split the difference." 3 In the estimation of Maine authorities,
the state had valid title to all the land it claimed, and it was not interested
in a compromise solution that simply divided the territory between the
Americans and the British.
During his stint as arbitrator, King William also dealt with the rebellion of the former Dutch province of Belgium; the revolt and the consequent weakening of the Netherlands brought the Dutch ruler into
greater diplomatic dependence on the British and undermined his cred-
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ibility as an impartial mediator. When he finally announced his proposed resolution of the Aroostook boundary dispute in 1831, he recommended what the governor of Maine had feared: rather than select between the competing American and British interpretations of the
boundary, he recommended a new line that divided the disputed territory between the Americans and the British. Although the British government approved the recommendation, the U.S. Senate objected, after
impassioned arguments from the Maine delegation regarding the dangers of ceding a state's territory without its consent. President Andrew
Jackson preferred the compromise solution but would not endorse it
without Maine's approval, and this plainly was not forthcoming. \'\Then
the United States rejected the king's compromise, the British withdrew
their endorsement.4
In 1837 Martin Van Buren became president of the United States.
Facing a host of pressing foreign and domestic issues, his administration
allowed the northeastern border question to languish. The economic
panic of 1837 brought various calls for government action, while agitation for annexation of Texas and calls to aid the Upper Canadian Rebellion demanded close attention. To deal with the troubles on the Canadian border, Van Buren dispatched Winfield Scott to Detroit and to
Niagara Falls, where he defused a mounting crisis.s
The situation in Maine became more tenuous in the late 1830s when
migrants from the Kennebec region discovered the agricultural potential
of the Aroostook valley. Generally Maine lacked good agricultural land,
but the Aroostook Valley's lime-rich soils would support the kind of stable farming population state authorities desperately wanted. While soil
composition made the disputed territory especially valuable to Maine,
military considerations shaped the British view of the dispute. A portion
of the disputed territory near Madawaska had served as a winter land
route between Halifax and Quebec since early colonial times, and when
the sea-lanes of the St. Lawrence River froze, this route was essential to
reaching Lower Canada. According to historian C.P. Stacey, the British
had discovered in the War of 1812 that "the defense of Canada was primarily a problem in communications,'' and accordingly they concerned
themselves with transportation issues. 6 Lumbering was another issue
that could not be ignored indefinitely. With no effective oversight in the
disputed territory, Maine authorities watched as local British residents
cut and hauled off much of the rich timber of the region.
President Van Buren asked the governor of Maine to ascertain
whether the state would support a negotiation of the 1783 boundary,
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The treaty tihat e nded the American Revolu tion fai led to delineate Maine's
northeastern boundary. In t he years after I 789, British diplomatts placed the
boundary be~ween the Penobscot and St. John rivers, while Maine political leaders insisted on the "height of land" between the St. John and the St. Lawrence.
This difference gave rise to the skirmishes and diplomatic exchanges collectively
known as the Aroostook War. Henry S. Burrage, Mni11e i11 the Northenstem
Bou 11dary Co·11troversy ( 1919).

but the state legislature remained adamant, delivering what was essentially an ultimatum to the federal government: Maine would conduct its
own survey if the Van Buren admin istration did not proceed within a
few months. Eventually Maine established its own boundary commission, and not sur prisingly, the commissioners concluded t ha t the
boundary intended by the 1783 treaty could be determined and no negotiation was necessar y. Jn April 1838 Maine's Whig Governor Edward
Kent urged the state's congressional delegation in Washington to work
with the fed eral government, so that "if we resor t, in self-defense, to in-
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dependent action, there may be no imputation upon our State of neglect
in setting forth her claims or declaring her ultimate determination." 7
In January 1839 Governor John Fairfield, a Democrat, dispatched an
armed posse of 200 men under the direction of seventy-year-old Rufus
Mcintire to arrest the trespassers cutting timber in the territory. A closed
session of the Maine legislature authorized the action, but the secrecy of
the resolution eventually became problematic, making it impossible for
the Maine authorities to notify New Brunswick authorities of the nature
of their maneuvers. With no official information about the armed band
moving into the disputed territory, New Brunswick authorities were left
to conclude the worst. After the posse arrested some trespassers and a
British official named James Maclauchlan, British officials arrested
Mcintire. Not willing to back down, the Maine authorities reinforced
their posse. New Brunswick Lieutenant Governor General Sir John Harvey issued a proclamation claiming the United States and Britain had
agreed that the British would have jurisdictional authority over the entire territory until the boundary was finally settled, bringing an impassioned outburst from Governor Fairfield.8
As they stood on the brink of war, Maine and New Brunswick authorities engaged in a testy correspondence. Harvey wrote on February
18 that good relations made it "indispensable that the armed force from
[Maine] ... be immediately withdrawn." Failure to withdraw would
leave him "no alternative but to take military occupation" of the disputed territory.9 The Solicitor-General of New Brunswick claimed the
posse violated British and international law and called for the release of
British official James Maclauchlan, and Fairfield promptly refused the
request. Charles Jarvis, the Maine land agent who took command of the
posse after Mcintire's arrest, closed his correspondence to the SolicitorGeneral with a warning: "I shall consider the approach to my station by
an armed force as an act of hostility, which will be met by me to the best
of my ability." 10 With tension increasing, the Maine legislature appropriated $800,000 for its defense. The governor called for 10,000 militiamen
and immediately sent 2,000 soldiers on the long march toward the
Aroostook Valley. Governor Fairfield wrote to President Van Buren complaining of Mcintire's treatment, which he called "such an indignity to
the State and the nation as cannot and ought not to be submitted to.'' 11
Both Maclauchlan and Mcintire were released, but passions remained
heated and calls for war became louder. Recognizing the possibility for
open warfare, the U.S. Congress appropriated $10 million for the military and authorized the president to call up 50,000 volunteers.
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Others were caught up in the war fever as well. Massachusetts still
owned half the public lands in Maine and therefore had a financial stake
in the outcome of the dispute. Bay State residents prepared to raise military companies to assist in the defense of Maine, and legislatures in
Maryland, Alabama, Virginia, Kentucky, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Indiana all passed resolutions pledging "support in case of war." Likewise the
legislative council in Nova Scotia indicated its willingness to support
New Brunswick.12
With tensions mounting, Fairfield wrote to Van Buren both officially
and privately. Officially, he passed along copies of correspondence from
Harvey and resolutions from the Maine legislature, and he described
Maine's militia preparations. Unofficially and confidentially, he urged
federal action: the people in Maine, he explained, would no longer submit to British aggression. "This is not a feverish and temporary excitement that may manifest itself in a few rash [and] indiscreet acts and
then die away"; it reflected Maine residents' "fixed purpose" and determination to "stand by their rights." Fairfield expressed concern over the
political implications should Van Buren fail to act appropriately. Still, he
closed on a conciliatory note: "while I am devoted to my state, I am also
your devoted friend. God grant that my attachment and duties to each
may never clash."13
With local tensions increasing, Secretary of State John Forsyth entered into negotiations with the British Minister in Washington, Henry
S. Fox, hoping to reduce tension and facilitate a solution of the crisis. On
February 23 Fox wrote to Forsyth to complain about "an unjustifiable
incursion into a part of the disputed territory" and maintained that the
United States had agreed to give Britain the right to exercise exclusive jurisdictional authority in the territory. Forsyth responded that Maine intended "no military occupation of the territory," but simply sought to
remove trespassers whose actions were in violation of the state's "right of
property." 14
The president submitted a complete report to Congress on the situation on February 26. Significantly, he took issue with Maine's decision to
send the posse without notifying New Brunswick authorities. "Had the
lieutenant-governor of New Brunswick been correctly advised of the
nature of the proceedings of the State of Maine, he would not have
regarded the transaction as requiring on his part any resort to force."
Van Buren noted prior correspondence from the secretary of state to
officials in Maine indicating that if negotiations to resolve the boundary
were unsuccessful, the two nations would ''accomplish that object
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In January I 839 Governor John
Fairfield sent an armed posse of 200
men to the disputed territory to
stop the theft of timber along the
Aroostook River. When the incident
brought the two nations to the
brink of war, President Martin Van
Buren dispatched General Scott to
Maine to negotiate a settlement.
Burrage, Mai11e in the Northeastern
Boundary Ccntroversy, and William
Holland, Tl1e Life a11d Political

Opi11io11s of Marti11 Van Buren
(1835 ).
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amicably ... by another arbitration, or by a commission, with an umpire." Thus Van Buren cautioned the residents of Maine that they should
be prepared for a solution determined by an international referee. Despite his desire to avoid armed conflict, Van Buren informed Congress
that he would consider it his constitutional duty to aid Maine, "if the authorities of New Brunswick should attempt to enforce the claim of exclusive jurisdiction set up by them by means of a military occupation on
their part of the disputed territory." IS
On February 27 Secretary of State Forsyth and Minister Fox signed
the Fox-Forsyth Memorandum. The document began by acknowledging
the different British and American understandings concerning jurisdiction in the disputed territory, then it specified the conduct expected of
both. Provincial authorities would "not seek to expel by military force
the armed party which has been sent by Maine," and Maine would "voluntarily, and without needless delay, withdraw beyond the bounds of the
disputed territory, any armed force now within them." The memorandum also specified that each side would release any arrested civil officers,
and that "nothing in this memorandum shall be construed to fortify or
weaken in any respect whatever, the claim of either Party to the ultimate
possession of the disputed territory." The memorandum noted that both
signatories could "only recommend" that Maine and New Brunswick
"regulate their future proceedings according to the terms . set forth,
until the final settlement of the territorial dispute;' or until the United
States and Great Britain resolved the question of jurisdiction. 16
States' Rights, Party Conflict, and the Maine-New Brunswick Boundary

Resolution of the northeast boundary dispute was complicated by
some of the states' rights protections in the U.S. Constitution. Provisions
of the Constitution prevented the federal government from surrendering any state's territory without the approval of the state. During the
Maine-New Brunswick dispute, Governor Fairfield argued that the
states were "sovereign and independent, except so far as that sovereignty
has been restrained or modified by the United States." He argued that
"the power to alienate the territory of a State ... to a foreign power ... is
no where granted."17 In Maine's case, the treaty of 1783 had specified a
boundary between Maine and New Brunswick, and the difficulties in establishing the boundary intended by that treaty did not alter the fact
that any concession to Britain was the equivalent of giving away territory
to which Maine had a legitimate claim. Thus Senate approval of any resolution that Maine opposed would establish the precedent that the fed-
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eral government could negotiate away a state's territory. Concern over
such a precedent complicated the negotiations with Britain.
The federal government offered both Maine and Massachusetts offer
of compensation with land in the western states if they would accept resolution of the boundary dispute. This met with the approval of Massachusetts, which looked to its Maine land holdings simply for income and
could derive satisfactory revenues from territory in the West. For Maine,
however, there were questions of territorial integrity and population; the
state looked to the Aroostook Valley as a region where fertile soil could
support stable agriculture in a way that was impossible in other areas of
Maine. For this reason, Maine rejected the federal offer of compensation.
Throughout the crisis Maine insisted on the right to protect its own
territorial claims. Governor Fairfield cautioned against rushing into military confrontation-a "calamity too dreadful to be lightly hazarded"but he insisted that there was "a point beyond which forbearance would
be more than pusillanimity. It would be treason against" future generations. In a passage that illustrated the way states could manipulate events
to force Washington's involvement, he announced that "if Maine should
take possession of her territory, up to the line of the treaty of 1783, ...
any attempt on the part of the British government to wrest that possession from her must bring the general government to her aid and defense."18 While Fairfield conceded that such steps would be taken only
after "mature deliberation," he nonetheless recognized that the state
could take steps that would require federal military involvement.
Maine justified its military force in Aroostook not by federal mandate but by state authority. Charles Jarvis insisted that he was "here under the direction of the executive of the State, and must remain until
otherwise ordered by the only authority recognized by me; and deeply as
I should regret a conflict between our respective countries, I shall consider the approach to my station by an armed force as an act of hostility,
which will be met by me to the best of my ability." 19 Jarvis's statement
suggested that he might not recognize the authority of the federal government unless it were endorsed by Governor Fairfield. Such apparent
disregard for national authority, widely endorsed by Maine political
leaders, complicated efforts by Washington and London to resolve this
cns1s.
Partisan politics posed a second challenge. By the 1830s, the political
arena had been polarized by the continuing debates over slavery and expansion in the West. In national politics Democrats tended to support
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expansion, while the Whigs were more restrained. Northern Whigs opposed expansion because it often targeted territory adjacent to the
southern states, where slavery was likely to be imported.20 These national issues infused state politics with a great deal of fervor, and in
Maine this intransigence further complicated efforts to resolve the
boundary crisis. One reason Maine had been so hostile to the Dutch
King's arbitration, a historian suggests, was that "neither party was willing, given the excited state of opinion, to yield an inch to the British." 21
In the 1830s and early 1840s Maine voters were divided almost equally
between Whigs and Democrats, and control of the government shifted
frequently from one party to the other. In 1838, the faction-ridden Democrats united behind John Fairfield and won the governorship by
roughly 3,300 votes out of nearly 90,000 cast. Whigs immediately attacked the new administration for its "soft" position on the boundary
dispute. 22
As tensions mounted in the disputed territory, both Whig and Democrat newspapers called for action against the British. When the state
dispatched Mcintire to the border, the Bangor Whig reported that it was
"wholly in favor of the object of this expedition," even though the men
leading it were Democrats, whom the paper labeled "brawling and noisy
politicians." When the British captured Rufus Mcintire, the Whig allied
with Democratic leaders, complaining that "our State has been for the
third time invaded and our citizens carried away and incarcerated in a
FOREIGN JAIL!"23 In Portland, the Whig papers assured their readers
that despite differences with the governor they would support his action
against the British. To inspire militia members to steel themselves for
confrontation with the British, the Belfast Republican coined the slogan,
"Maine and Her soil, or BLOOD!" A Montreal newspaper noted that
"Whigs and Democrats, so opposed on almost all other questions, think
alike" on this question "and demand war with equal enthusiasm." Outside of Maine, however, Whig journals advocated a peaceful settlement.
According to scholar David Lowenthal, the "Whig journals of Boston
and New York considered Governor Fairfield a hot-headed fanatic who
was rushing the country into war. Commercial interests deprecated his
policy." 24
The signing of the Fox-Forsyth Memorandum on February 27 angered many in Maine who thought Washington had compromised the
interests of the state. Maine Senator John Ruggles complained that "the
Administration has no notion of backing Maine in the vindication of
her rights." He groused that legislators such as Silas Wright of New York,
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Pennsylvania's James Buchanan, and John Calhoun of South Carolina
were all working against Maine's efforts to secure support from the
Washington government. Van Buren, according to Ruggles, looked after
the interests of the South and the West in order to ensure his re-election.
"Maine bows down and worships the Administration from which it receives nothing but insult." 25 With both parties in Maine contributing to
the furor, the Democratic administration in Washington, shaken from
its hopes that the contention over the Maine boundary would blow over,
sent Winfield Scott to Maine to seek a peaceful resolution of the situation.
Winfield Scott and the Triumph of Bipartisanship
Winfield Scott was an unlikely candidate to play the role of heropacifier. Described by a biographer as "an aristocrat of the old school,
and a good deal of a snob," he had pronounced philosophical objections
to the democratization of American life and politics during the Jacksonian period. His distaste for Jacksonian democracy led to his involvement
with the Whig party that rose in opposition to Old Hickory's leadership
and policies. Scott eventually became the party's presidential nominee
and was defeated in the 1856 election. At odds with the Democratic Van
Buren and Fairfield administrations, he was also cool to the idea of militia and citizen-soldiers, his experience in 1812-1814 having taught him
that war was a matter best left to professionals.26 In many respects Scott
was the opposite of Andrew Jackson, who relished his command of large
numbers of militia in the Battle of New Orleans and who became a
champion of democracy and the common man. In fact, earlier clashes
between Jackson and Scott culminated in an exchange of letters so
heated that Jackson challenged Scott to a duel.
Although Van Buren dispatched Scott to Maine in "absolute confidence" and in "cordial friendship," Scott's earlier regard for Van Buren
had cooled, and in fact he might have been thinking of Van Buren as a
potential rival in an upcoming presidential election. This distancing,
coupled with Scott's usual pomposity and arrogance, might have complicated his relationship with Maine's Jacksonian leaders. Nor was Scott's
personality particularly engaging. An aide reported that "the chief ruling
passion of the general was ambition and its uniform attendant, jealousy." Ulysses S. Grant wrote that Scott "cultivated a style peculiar his
own" and that he "was not averse to speaking of himself, often in the
third person, and he could bestow praise upon the person he was talking
about with the least embarrassment." In short, few expected Scott's mis-
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Major General John Harvey, K.C.B.
In 1836-1837 Harvey was lieutenant
governor of Prince Edward Island,
and from 1837 to 1841, lieutenant
governor of New Brunsiwck. He went
on to serve as governor of Newfo undland between 1841 and 1846 . As a
lie utenant colonel in the War of 1812,
Harvey encountered Scott across the
battle lines, and later th·e t\-vo became
friends. This proved useful when the
American general arrived in Maine to
quell the incipient war on the no rtheastern front ier. VA 27-39a- courtesy
of the Rooms Corporation of Newfoundland and Labrador, Provincial
Archives of Newfoundland and
Labrador.

sion to Maine to end in success. In addition to his difficult personality,
het would be contending against angry Maine residents. Before departing for Maine, he himself told Van Buren "if you want war, I need only
look on in silence. The Maine people will make it for you fast and hot
enough . . . . [B]ut if peace be your wish, I can give no assurance of
success." 27
The general arrived in Maine shortly after the signing of the FoxForsyth Memorandum, at a time when frustration with the federal government was at fever pitch. "If the contemplated visit of General Scott to
Maine is only to persuade a withdrawal of our troops from the disputed
territories, or a relinquishment of our present position, he might as well
stay away;' a state senator complained. When Scott arrived in Augusta, he
"found a bad temper prevailing." Democrats were "dominant in every
branch of Government," but in the legislature "the weight of talent and
information, .. . was in the Whig minority." Both parties played to a constituency clamoring for military action, Scott recalled; "the Whigs were
unwilling to abandon that hobby-horse entirely; but the Democrats were
first in the saddle and rode furiously." In time, Scott would help both
parties off of that hobby-horse.28
Scott won favor in Maine by criticizing the Fox-Forsyth Memorandum, calling it a "bungle" in which the "people of Maine ... were re-
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quired to withdraw their forces from the territory in dispute simply on
the promise that British officers would not seek to expel them by force!without any reciprocal obligation;-the other party being left free to remain; to fortify themselves; to continue their depredations, undisturbed,
and for an indefinite time!" 29 Scott's prior relationship with Sir John
Harvey also aided his efforts to bring peace to the Maine frontier. The
two had dealt with each other as combatants during the War of 1812,
and in fact Scott was responsible for sparing Harvey's life at one point.
Later, Scott purchased and returned to Harvey a portrait of Harvey's
wife stolen during the American raid on York, Ontario.30 Thus despite
their prior status as combatants in rival armies, Scott and Harvey had established a reservoir of good will, which Scott could utilize to ease the
cns1s.
Harvey wrote to Scott on January 13 indicating "the high degree of
satisfaction which I had individually derived from hearing of your selection for the very delicate and difficult command on the frontier of the
northern states opposite the British provinces." Harvey expressed hope
that the two could meet in person to resolve issues. Scott responded by
requesting a declaration that New Brunswick would not seek to expel
the Maine posse by force, as specified in the Fox-Forsyth Memorandum.
Were Harvey to make such a declaration, Scott reported, the troops of
Maine would no doubt "be immediately recalled and the detachment, in
march thither from the interior of the State, be at once ordered to halt."
Scott explained that a civil posse, "limited to a small number ... and restricted to certain specific duties," would remain in the territory, but
otherwise, "if we can avoid collision on the Northeastern Frontier it is
not likely that the United States" would send federal troops to Maine.
Harvey noted the need to defend access to a portion of the St. John Valley essential to British communications, but reported that British troops
would avoid "offensive operations" against the posse-again in accordance with the Fox-Forsyth Memorandum. 31 Although residents and
leaders in Maine had earlier derided the memorandum, and Scott himself had publicly criticized it, it nonetheless became the basis for agreement once Scott convinced the two political parties in Maine to accept a
peaceful course of action.
Scott next turned to Maine's political leaders. When he arrived in
Maine, his party affiliation had been unknown. Maine Whigs, seeing
him as a representative of the Democratic administration in Washington, assumed he was a Democrat, or viewed him as an apolitical Army
officer. After winning Fairfield's confidence, Scott revealed his party af-

"The Lion of the Dny"

229

L

~~
S

E

1

.....,..,.

;==>--

...........
,_

O°'O'C."fCE..o;
"'°'JftJA~
er~

1t>tf.-r11i1
........ ..J .... .,

Maine politicians insisted that under the Constitution the federa l governmen t
could not surrender a state's territory without the stale 's explicit approval.
Maine would defend its territorial rights against 1ew Brunswick-and against
an overly conciliatory federal government in Washington. Burrage, Mni11e i11 the
Northeastern Bo1111d11ry Co11tro11ersy.
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filiation and suggested that he approach the Whigs in the state legislature to solicit their support for a peaceful resolution. At a dinner party
with Whig U.S. Senator George Evans and leading Democrats from the
Maine legislature, Scott seated himself among the Whigs. Initially, he
found them "sulky" and unresponsive, until Evans called to their attention his political affiliations, calling Scott "as good a Whig as the best of
them."32
Shortly thereafter, Governor Fairfield addressed the legislature,
claiming that the people of Maine were "not desirous of hurrying the
two nations into a war." Such an event was "anxiously to be avoided, if it
can be without dishonor," he continued. "We owe too much to the
Union, to ourselves, and above all, to the spirit and principles of Christianity, to bring about a conflict of arms with a people having with us a
common origin, speaking a common language, and bound to us by so
many ties of common interest." Fairfield told the legislators that he was
"fully satisfied" that the New Brunswick authorities had "abandoned all
idea of occupying the disputed territory with a military force, and of attempting an expulsion of our party."33 With the blessing of the legislature, he agreed to Scott's proposal. In anticipation of a peaceful resolution of the boundary dispute, Maine would halt its military efforts in the
disputed territory and the authorities of New Brunswick would not seek
to expel the Maine forces.
Despite misgivings about the Fox-Forsyth Memorandum, Scott won
support from Maine leaders for an agreement remarkably similar in
form and substance. The key difference between the earlier document
and the agreement signed by John Fairfield and Sir John Harvey in midMarch was its timing and Scott's careful preparation. Scott carefully consulted both political parties in Maine, thereby removing the issue from
the realm of partisan conflict, and at the same time his stalling allowed
the fervor for war to subside and the militia to grow weary of mundane
drilling duty. By March, it was politically acceptable for the Fairfield administration to agree to a truce that may have been problematic a month
or two earlier.
Along with Scott's diplomatic handling of the situation, John Fairfield's political tact was key to the resolution of the dispute. The governor's insistence upon the imperatives of honor increased the difficulty of
resolving the situation, but his calmness in pointing out the "un-Christian" nature of warfare among people bound by ties of language and custom facilitated a peaceful solution. With the easing of tension in spring
1839, it was possible for the United States and Britain to move toward
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While t he fortifications built so hastily in the spri ng of 1839 were never used in
battle, they left their names as testimony to the two governors mostr involved in
the volatile events of 1839. Fort Kent, named for Edward Kent, still stands on
the banks of the St. John River, as does Fort Fairfield on the Aroostook, named
for the Democratic governor who followed h im into office. Burrage, Maine i11

the Northeastern Boul/(fary Co11troversy.

settlement of the boundary, which would come with the 1842 WebsterAshburton Treaty that established the border along the St. John and St.
Francis rivers-neither to the north, at the watershed ben"/een the St.
Lawrence and the St. John, as Maine had insisted, nor to the south, between the Penobscot and the St. John watersheds, as the British had
claimed.

The Legacy of Partisan Politics and States' Rights
With the election of 1840 looming, it might have been difficult to
bring Whigs and Democrats together to resolve the boundary question.
But with a Whig general representing the Democrat administration, bi-

partisan agreement was easier to achieve, and the Aroostook War became the struff of legend or comedy, rather than the starting point of the
third British-American war in sixty years. T iming was essential to this
outcome. What seemed unacceptable in late February, with the Maine
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militia newly mustered on the northeastern border and war fervor at its
peak, was just a few short weeks later seen as an honorable way to avoid
hostilities.
Winfield Scott, despite his reputation as a pompous, self-important
Whig, was indispensable in resolving the conflict surrounding the
Maine-New Brunswick border. He accomplished his goals by providing
a level of credibility that reassured the people of Maine and the British
authorities in New Brunswick. No less important, his negotiations
bought enough time to let the enthusiasm for war pass, while assembling the political factors necessary to assure bipartisan agreement in
Maine. 34 The crisis on the border in 1839 proved that unresolved issues
could bring these nations to the brink of war, but it also proved that
there was much in the relationship between the British, the Canadians,
and the Americans that could make for an enduring rapprochement, if
the proper restraints were observed and exercised.
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